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Abstract— The healthcare sector is an appealing target to 
attackers due to the high value of patient data on the black 
market. Patient data can be profitable to illegal actors either 
through direct sale or extortion by ransom. Additionally, 
employees present a persistent threat as they are able to access 
the data of almost any patient without reprimand. Without 
proactive monitoring of audit records, data breaches go 
undetected and employee behaviour is not deterred. In 2016, 
450 data breaches occurred affecting more than 27 million 
patient records. 26.8% of these breaches were due to hacking 
and ransomware. In May 2017, a global ransomware campaign 
adversely affected approximately 48 UK hospitals. Response to 
this attack, named WannaCry, resulted in hospital networks 
being taken offline, and non-emergency patients being refused 
care. Hospitals must maintain patient trust and ensure that the 
information security principles of Integrity, Availability and 
Confidentiality are applied to Electronic Patient Record EPR 
data. With over 83% of hospitals adopting EPRs, access to 
healthcare data needs to be monitored proactively for 
malicious activity. Therefore, this paper presents research 
towards a system that uses advanced data analytics techniques 
to profile user’s behaviour in order to identify patterns and 
anomalies. Visualisation techniques are then applied to 
highlight these anomalies to aid the situational awareness of 
patient privacy officers within healthcare infrastructures. 
Keywords-Electronic Patient Records; Patient Privacy; Patient 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare infrastructures are complacent towards the 
risks of patient privacy violations [1]. Reduced information 
visibility due to data complexity, fragmentation, 
interoperability and lack of specialisation undermine the 
security of these organisations [1]. Visualisation techniques 
can provide both awareness and modelling capabilities for 
critical infrastructures [2]. Applying these techniques to aids 
the understanding of how patient data is accessed within 
healthcare infrastructures. The goal of security engineers is 
to develop tools capable of detecting malicious, multi-stage 
intrusion attacks. These tools should weight the individual 
attacks, and compare them against the enormous and 
disparate database of attacks within the network [3]. An 
intruder’s objectives should be determined based on the 
analysis of the entire dataset of attacks as a whole, rather 
than just an individual attack [3].  
Electronic Patient Record (EPR) systems are vulnerable 
to both insider and outsider threats [4]. A potential insider 
threat refers to a legitimate user looking at data when it is not 
appropriate to do so; such as looking at the record of a 
celebrity. An external threat is comprised of the theft of a 
legitimate user’s credentials, allowing the attacker 
uninhibited access to EPR data. This is known as an Active 
Persistent Threat (APT). It is, therefore, a challenge to 
mitigate both types of threats. 
Current Rules-Based solutions to these issues are 
effective at detecting predictable insider threats. They can 
process the large quantities of audit data, and can process 
rules against that data. For example, a rule can be set to 
inform Information Security if anyone other than a set list of 
clinicians accesses the patient record of a celebrity or famous 
individual. Any violation of this will then be reported 
automatically to the Information Security team. However, 
this cannot detect the threat of an attacker who has acquired 
the logon credentials of a clinician; which is achieved 
through either phishing or social engineering techniques and 
enables EPR data exfiltration. Additionally, rules are also be 
set to detect if a user is looking at the record of a patient with 
the same surname as them to identify potential patient 
confidentiality violations. Similarly, if an attacker has 
unauthorised login credentials (and is surveying a patient’s 
record) the rules set would not make provisions for the 
detection.  
Therefore, this paper proposes an advanced data analytics 
and visualisation-based approach to patient privacy violation 
detection within EPR systems. Advanced data analytics 
algorithms have the capability to learn patterns of data and 
profile users’ behaviour, which can then be represented 
visually. Advanced data analytics detect when a user’s 
behaviour has changed, by comparing behaviours, such as 
the type of actions being taken and the patients they are 
viewing. 
It is unfeasible to detect fully all illegitimate access 
within EPR systems, but it is feasible to eliminate legitimate 
access. In doing so, it becomes possible to focus the attention 
of information security analysts to where it is needed, within 
the comprehensive EPR audit datasets. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section II 
presents a literature review of the background research on 
patient privacy within EPR systems. Section III outlines the 
systematic approach and presents our results and a sample of 
test data. Section IV discusses conclusions and the future 
work to be done.   
II. BACKGROUND 
Authorised users can access EPR data from virtually 
anywhere; allowing increased productivity compared with 
paper-only records and allowing clinicians to make informed 
decisions towards improving healthcare quality for patients 
[5]. The management of patient data in electronic form 
decreases healthcare administration costs, strengthens care 
provider productivity and increases patient safety [6].  
The proliferation of technology within healthcare has 
brought the advantages of improved efficiency of record 
keeping, easier detection and prevention of fraud, waste and 
abuse, and an improvement on the overall quality of care [7]. 
However, with the added benefits of technology in 
healthcare, the potential for unauthorised and illegal access 
to patient information has increased [8]. Users may abuse 
their privileges for personal reasons, such as viewing records 
of relatives, friends, neighbours, co-workers or celebrities 
[5]. Therefore, patients are becoming increasingly concerned 
regarding the privacy and security of their health data [9]. 
The cost to a healthcare organisation caused by a security 
breach is one of the highest of any industry and leads to the 
loss of trust of patients [10]. 
A. EPR Audit Logs 
When there is reason to suspect that unauthorised 
accesses have occurred, a review of the audit logs is 
undertaken by a security expert. This is inefficient, as it 
requires the information to be collated and reviewed by a 
security expert. It is a process that is purely retrospective [5]. 
Therefore, there is a motivation to automate and alleviate the 
burdens associated with this process [7]. The fundamental 
limitations in privacy officers manually reviewing audit logs 
for potentially suspicious accesses are threefold [5]. Firstly, 
the volume of audit records means that audit logs are only 
practically useful as adjuncts to investigate suspected 
breaches, rather than a tool that can be utilised to proactively 
find inappropriate accesses. Secondly, audit records can only 
provide data regarding the access itself, and contains no 
situational or relationship information or knowledge 
regarding the access. Thirdly, the process is labour-intensive, 
without guidance of where to look for potential breaches, 
inappropriate accesses are buried amongst the audits of 
appropriate accesses. 
B. Access Control 
Healthcare systems typically employ access control 
solutions [11], where once an individual has been 
authenticated, they are allowed unhindered access inside the 
perimeter [5]. It is a challenge to impose an access control 
policy on employees in a healthcare setting due to the 
dynamic and unpredictable care patterns of hospital care [7].  
The Access Matrix Model (AMM) is a conceptual 
framework that specifies each user’s permissions for each 
object in the system [12]. Although it allows for a thorough 
mapping of access rights, it does not scale well, and lacks the 
ability to support dynamic changes of access rights, which 
makes it difficult to apply to EPRs [13]. 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) maps users to roles 
and maps permissions to the roles [14]. Job positions within 
the enterprise and tasks the employees need to perform are 
identified, and privileges are assigned to these positions to 
enable the employees to accomplish their tasks [15]. Whilst 
more computationally tractable, RBAC roles tend to be static 
and inflexible, and therefore not responsive to the shifting 
nature of roles [16]. 
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) provides 
flexible, context-aware access control through evaluating the 
attributes of entities, it’s subject and object, the operation, 
and the contextual environment of the request [17]. Boolean 
logic can then be applied to the operational request to 
determine access rights. ABAC therefore allows for a higher 
number of discrete inputs and provides a larger, more 
definitive set of rules to express policies than RBAC. 
Experience Based Access Management (EBAM) 
emphasises the accountability and use of audit data to detect 
illegitimate access [15]. EBAM enterprises often manually 
review the audit logs of VIPs to determine inappropriate 
accesses [18]. Break The Glass (BTG) is a policy, which 
allows users to override access controls in necessary 
instances [19]. EBAM enterprises would manually review 
the audit logs every time a user broke the glass [15]. 
Task-based Access Control (TBAC) extends the user-
object relationship though the inclusion of task-based and 
contextual information [20]. However TBAC is limited to 
contexts that relate to tasks, or workflow progress and EPRs 
cannot always be easily portioned into tasks [13]. 
Team-based Access Control (TeBAC) groups users in an 
organisation and associates a collaboration context with the 
activity to be performed [21]. However, these models have 
not been fully developed or implemented and it remains 
unclear how to implement them within a dynamic framework 
[13]. 
C. Detection Approaches 
The following section examines several related common 
detection approaches to anomaly detection in large datasets: 
 Signature detection is a rules-based algorithm that 
constructs a set of rules based on historic breaches 
and can detect correctly known patterns whilst being 
interpretable [22]. However, it cannot detect unseen 
patterns and cannot assign risk scores [23]. 
 Anomaly detection compares incoming instances to 
previously built profiles and can detect novel 
patterns, although it requires a large quantity of 
historic data [24]. Additionally, the output is known 
to be problematic to interpret and the technique 
produces false positives [25]. 
 Clustering is invoked to integrate similar data 
instances into groups [26]. Clustering evaluates each 
instance with respect to the cluster it belongs to, 
while nearest neighbour analyses each instance with 
respect to its own local neighbourhood [13]. 
 Spectral Projection estimates the principal 
components from the covariance of the training data 
of normal events [27]. The testing phase compares 
each point with the components and assigns an 
anomaly score based on the points distance from the 
principal components [13]. 
 Classifier detection determines a classification 
function based on a labelled training set [28] and can 
be fast, accurate and assign risk scores to all events 
[29]. However, acquiring class labelled data is 
expensive and scoring unlabelled events is important 
in large scale data mining, as human validation is 
limited and costly [30]. 
D. Related Work 
Machine learning models are trained on historical access 
data to classify future data access patterns [7]. Supervised 
machine learning models, such as Support Vector Machines 
(SVMs), linear regression and logistic regression have been 
applied successfully to the challenge of detecting 
inappropriate access within Electronic Patient Record 
systems [5][7][10]. 
For example, Community-based Anomaly Detection 
System (CADS)  is an unsupervised learning framework to 
detect insider threats based on information recorded in audit 
logs of collaborative environments [13]. It is based on the 
observation that typical users tend to form community 
structures, so users with a low connection, to such 
communities, are indicative of anomalous behaviour. The 
model consists of two primary components. Firstly, 
relational pattern extraction, which infers community 
structures from access logs and subsequently derives 
communities, which serve as the CADS core. Secondly, 
potentially illicit behaviour, where CADS uses a formal 
statistical model to measure the deviation of users from the 
inferred communities to predict which users are anomalies 
[13]. CADS does not implement supervised learning 
techniques to further classify the data with feedback from 
patient privacy officers.  
AI^2
 
is another example of a cyber-security machine 
learning system, which improves its accuracy over time 
through feedback from security analysts [31]. AI^2
 
is 
composed of the following four components. Firstly, a Big 
Data Processing System, which quantifies the behaviours 
and features of raw data. Secondly, an Outlier Detection 
System, which learns a descriptive model of data features 
extracted via unsupervised learning, using either density, 
matrix decomposition, or replicator neural networks. Thirdly, 
a Feedback Mechanism and Continuous Learning, which 
incorporates analyst input through a user interface. The 
system highlights the top k outlier events or entities and tasks 
the analyst with identifying whether they are malicious; the 
feedback is then input back into the supervised learning 
module. Fourthly, a Supervised Learning Model, which 
predicts whether a new incoming event is normal or 
malicious, and uses analysts feedback to refines the model. 
Raw data is input into AI^2
 
that computes features 
describing the entities of the data set. Using these features, 
an unsupervised machine learning module identifies extreme 
and rare events in the data. These events are then ranked 
based upon a predefined metric and presented to the analyst, 
who ranks the behaviours as normal or malicious (and as 
pertaining to a particular attack type). Finally, these labels 
are input to the supervised learning module. The novelty of 
the system proposed in this paper, to that of AI^2,
 
is the 
addition of visualisation techniques to aid the analyst to 
understand and explore the data. There is also a specific 
focus on EPR data, which differ from other enterprise 
infrastructures due to their reliance on insecure medical 
devices, legacy systems, and bespoke software. 
The use of statistical and machine learning techniques 
have previously been used to detect fraud in financial 
reporting [32], to detect fraud in credit card transaction data 
[33], to construct a spam email detector [34], and to solve a 
fraud detection problem at a car insurance company [35]. 
III. APPROACH 
As the background demonstrates, there is a clear need to 
address the issue of lack of situational awareness on the part 
of information security professionals within healthcare 
infrastructures. In this section, an approach is put forward for 
analysing data within healthcare infrastructures, processing it 
to eliminate low-risk data points and visualising it in such a 
way that data anomalies become apparent. Our research to 
date has focused on the development of a system for 
modelling data flow within healthcare infrastructures 
[36][37]. The system assists information security officers, 
within healthcare organisations, to improve the situational 
awareness of patient data confidentiality risks. 
A. Approach 
The novel contribution presented in [36][37] involves the 
use of advanced data analytics techniques, in addition to an 
analyst-in-the-loop and the use of visualised attack events. 
Low-risk data is analysed, processed and pre-filtered using 
advanced data analytics techniques before the visualisation 
of the data. This is then visualised and presented to an 
analyst. The analyst then classifies events within the 
presented visualisation, which provides feedback to the 
system. Through the use of the analyst-in-the-loop both 
models are used to continuously defend the healthcare 
infrastructure against current attack vectors. The aim is to 
collect, process, and filter big data sets to provide users of an 
overall understanding of system behaviour in order to detect 
security breaches and general anomalies. 
The system provides contextual awareness to detect 
anomalous behaviour within EPR audit activity. The main 
challenge of the work involves big data analytics to process 
datasets generated by healthcare infrastructures.  
The system put forward in this paper combines several 
related data sets and presents them, in such a way, as to 
identify relationships between them. EPR audit data and 
behavioural patterns are understood, in order to assist end 
users in finding the potential vulnerabilities within the health 
care infrastructure. The data analysis techniques involve 
interpreting dataset patterns and identify potential on-going 
patient privacy violations.  
The visualisations cluster together salient points and use 
size to indicate potential threat levels. This gives the analyst 
a broad overview of the current EPR security at a glance. 
From here, the visualisation can be interacted with, explored 
by the analyst to investigate the data points and find in-depth 
technical information about each data point. Additionally, 
the analyst can provide feedback to the system and rank the 
highlighted data points as either safe, or as pertaining to a 
patient privacy violation.  
B. Case Study 
In this section, a case study of the EPR audit data is 
presented. This rich dataset contains 1,007,727 rows of audit 
logs of every user and their EPR activity in a UK hospital 
over a period of 18 months (28-02-16 – 21-08-17). Each 
User UID, Patient UID and Device name is tokenised 
through isolating the unique entries and assigning each 
value an incrementing number. There are 1,515 unique User 
UIDs, 72,878 unique Patient UIDs and 2,270 unique 
Devices within the dataset. 
The dataset consist of the following fields: 
 Date - The date the patient record was accessed 
 Time - The time the patient record was accessed 
 Device (Tokenised) - The name of the device the patient 
record was accessed 
 User UID (Tokenised) - A tokenised representation of 
the User who accessed the patient record 
 Routine - The routine performed whilst accessing the 
patient record (was the record updated, was a letter 
printed etc.) 
 Patient UID (Tokenised) - A tokenised representation 
of the patient record that was accessed 
 Duration - The number of seconds the patient record 
was accessed (this number counts for as long as the 
record is on the screen, so may not always be an 
accurate reflection of how long the User was actively 
interacting with the data) 
 Latest Adm Date - The date the patient was last 
admitted to the hospital 
 Latest Dis Date - The date the patient was last 
discharged from the hospital 
A snapshot of the first 10 rows in the dataset is presented in 
Table 1.  
TABLE I.  EPR AUDIT SAMPLE DATA 
Date Time Device User UIDRoutine Patient UIDDurationLocationLatest Adm DateLatest Dis ate
28-02-16 00:00 362 865 PHA.ORDS58991 54 28-02-16 29-02-16
28-02-16 00:02 103 677 ASF 4786 13 22-07-08 22-07-08
28-02-16 00:02 103 677 ASF 4786 54 22-07-08 22-07-08
28-02-16 00:02 923 199 REC REC:(DRP) UK.OE17278 77 15-02-16 15-02-16
28-02-16 00:04 103 677 ASF VH 14067 39 28-09-04 28-09-04
28-02-16 00:04 845 1489 PHA.ORDS49304 22 23-01-02 23-01-02
28-02-16 00:04 923 199 REC UK.OE62121 147 08-02-16 08-02-16
28-02-16 00:06 923 199 REC REC:(DRP) UK.OE60948 165 08-01-16 08-01-16
28-02-16 00:08 775 568 NOTE 32826 75 25-01-12 25-01-12
28-02-16 00:10 393 1361 PHA.ORDS28106 49 16-08-06 16-08-06  
In Figure 1, a heatmap is presented of the dataset 
comparing User UID to the duration of the patient record 
access. The graph shows that there is consistent point 
density of up to 47,341 in the first row of the matrix, 
indicating that most patient records are only accessed for 
fewer than 300 seconds (5 minutes). This would represent 
normal behaviour within the hospital. Representing the data 
as a heatmap highlights clear anomalies in the data.  
 
Figure 1 - Heatmap - User UID and Duration 
Notably, as displayed in Figure 1, users B and C are 
identified spending over 18,000 seconds (over 5 hours) 
accessing patient records.  Additionally users, A, D, E and F 
all spent over 16,000 seconds (almost 4.5 hours) accessing 
records. These anomalies can be investigated by an analyst 
indicating potentially illegitimate access to EPR data. 
C. Discussion 
These initial results display only preliminary explorations 
of the dataset and demonstrate the potential insights the 
dataset holds. Once feature selection and pre-processing 
work has been completed on the data, machine learning 
models will be used to explore the data further, with a 
particular emphasis on unsupervised learning such as 
clustering. This will allow initial patterns within the data to 
be identified to understand the data and identify illegitimate 
access to patient records within this real world EPR dataset. 
Extracting features from this data (such as mean, median, 
mode and range of duration), will be used to train classifiers 
to autonomously learn normal and abnormal patterns 
through supervised learning techniques. This process will 
occur once the data has been clustered through the use of 
unsupervised learning algorithms. In combing both 
unsupervised and supervised machine learning techniques, 
the system will aid privacy officers in their situational 
awareness of access to patient records and identify outliers 
for investigation. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Electronic Patient Record (EPR) data is both sensitive and 
valuable. Patients need to be assured of three crucial security 
principles regarding their healthcare data. Firstly, patients 
need to be assured that the data stored is trustworthy and 
accurate. Secondly, patients need to be assured that the data 
can be reliably accessed by healthcare professionals when 
needed. And thirdly, patients need to be assured that only 
authorised healthcare professionals have access to the data, 
and only access it when it is appropriate to do so. It is 
therefore of utmost importance that the Information Security 
principles of Integrity, Availability and Confidentiality are 
applied to EPR data. Therefore, this paper presents research 
towards a system, which can detect unusual data behaviour 
through the use of advanced data analytics and visualisation 
techniques. Machine learning algorithms have the capability 
to learn patterns of data and profile users’ behaviour, which 
can be represented visually. The proposed system is tailored 
to healthcare infrastructures by learning typical data 
behaviours and profiling users. The system adds to the 
defence-in-depth of the healthcare infrastructure by 
understanding the unique configuration of the EPR and 
autonomously analysing user’s access. 
Future work will build on the visualisation work 
undertaken in the research case studies presented in this 
paper. The visualisations will allow the user to explore the 
data and understand the patterns and trends within the 
comprehensive EPR audit data sets. Unsupervised machine 
learning techniques will be implemented to classify this data 
in future work as there is limited abnormal data and a lack of 
labelled training data. Feedback from the analysts will 
inform the machine learning algorithms and refine the results 
to reduce alert fatigue. Machine Learning algorithms will 
allow the system to pick up on patterns and trends in the date 
without being explicitly taught them, as in Rules-Based 
Analytics. For example, if a user typically only logs into 
their account on weekdays, then if the account is logged in 
on a weekend, it may be an indication that the users’ 
username and password has been compromised by an 
attacker. The attacker could either be illegally accessing 
hospital records, or searching for further vulnerabilities 
within the EPR in order to perform a privilege escalation 
attack.  
Additionally, the machine learning algorithms will be 
automated and tested on “live” real-world data once it has 
been refined. This will allow the process outlined in this 
paper to alert information security analysts of illegitimate 
shortly after they occur. Over time, the analyst will be able to 
provide feedback to the system through the use of supervised 
machine learning algorithms, and the algorithms will be 
refined and tailored to the unique threat landscape and 
infrastructure of the hospital.  
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